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Two recent books impressively show that ʻʻhuman enhancementʼʼ is now an established 
topic in biomedical ethics. The number of serious papers and books about improving 
human functioning had already reached a critical mass several years ago—the general 
debate about genetic engineering dating as far back as to the 1970s, a first 
comprehensive collection on ʻʻhuman enhancementʼʼ being published in 1998 by Erik 
Parens under the title ʻʻEnhancing Human Traitsʼʼ, and since then a significant rise in 
discussions regarding the possibility to intentionally alter human functioning, mainly 
stimulated by the 2003 report ʻʻBeyond Therapyʼʼ of the US Presidentʼs Council on 
Bioethics—, but the two collections of articles in renowned publishing houses now 
canonise the topic as a major field of research in biomedical ethics.
The books—ʻʻMedical Enhancement and Posthumanityʼʼ (from now on MEP) and ʻʻHuman 
Enhancementʼʼ (from now on HE)—have many features in common. Both try to present a 
comprehensive and balanced overview of the ethical debate about biotechnological 
interventions in humans and both treat the topic essentially from two angles: a theoretical 
one and an applied one. With this aim they gather 13 (MEP), respectively 18 (HE) 
scholarly papers from various academic disciplines (mainly by ethicists and philosophers, 
but they also include a political scientist, a theologian, a legal scholar, and an economist).
The two books under review tackle the substantial theoretical questions related to the 
topic: Is any sharp distinction between therapy and enhancement conceptually possible, or 
convincing? And if so, would this distinction be relevant for the ethical judgment regarding 
therapeutical or enhancing interventions? Although these questions appear in many of the 
collected papers, the article ʻʻTherapy, Enhancement and Improvementʼʼ by Ruth Chadwick 
(in MEP) is particularly helpful. Chadwick shows, with a suggested further distinction 
between enhancement and improvement, the context-dependency of the terms with which 
we make our moral judgments. Another important theoretical issue is the question of what 
constitutes human nature and whether there is any reason to prefer ʻʻthe naturalʼʼ over ʻʻthe 
non-naturalʼʼ on this matter. Here is a rich playground for fine-grained conceptual 
clarifications, an opportunity which many contributors have successfully exploited.
Both volumes illustrate the practical challenges and current developments in the wide field 
of intentionally altering human functioning: attempts to slow the aging process, 
neuroenhancement by use of psychoactive substances, the selection of traits in oneʼs 
offspring by genetic testing or engineering, technological devices connected to the human 
body (particularly the brain) to improve certain functions or to create new ones, but also 
the ʻʻclassicalʼʼ topics of cosmetic surgery (Mary Devereaux in MEP) and the ʻʻethos of elite 
sportʼʼ (Torbjörn Tannsjö in HE). Taken together, the two volumes paint a broad picture of 
the current developments giving rise to the ethical debate, including also some more 
remote perspectives such as whether we could (and should) enhance our ʻʻtruth 
orientationʼʼ in a not perfectly convincing article by Robin Hanson (in HE), as well as a 
brilliant discussion by Nick Bostrom and Anders Sandberg (in HE) on how we could profit 
from the evolutionary ʻʻwisdom of natureʼʼ to dif- ferentiate between enhancements which 
are worth pursuing and those we should stay away from.
A minor question: Why does the applied part follow the theoretical discussion in both 
volumes? Should it not be the other way round? After all, it is the practical problems which 
call for theoretical clarifications to help answer practical challenges.
The focus on posthumanity, especially present in MEP, is particularly interesting. MEP has 
both a stronger historical orientation (including an informative article on the history of 
medical enhancement by Urban Wiesing, and an accumulation of material for a ʻʻcritical 
history of posthumanismʼʼ by Andy Miah) and tackles the concept of ʻʻposthumanityʼʼ more 
directly (particularly in the evocative article ʻʻWhy I Want to be a Posthuman when I Grow 
Upʼʼ by Nick Bostrom). And it is right to focus on post-humanity, as—in my opinion—it is 
the possibility of changing the human life form which ultimately constitutes the most 
interesting part of the debate on human enhancement. Any given understanding of what it 
means to be a human being is challenged by the sheer possibility that things could be 
somehow different, even if we cannot clearly see the possible alterations to any familiar 
concept of ʻʻhuman natureʼʼ yet. While the debate about altering an isolated human trait—
such as cognitive capacities, outward appearance or physical performance—and 
discussing its possible outcomes for individuals and collectives provides interesting 
questions that have been addressed by scholars over the years, the bigger challenge of 
the enhancement debate lies in the ʻʻanthropologicalʼʼ questioning of our human lives qua 
human lives and deciding which human traits we want to preserve when basically 
everything could be intentionally altered. This more general, anthropological question 
appears prominently in the new collections.
A wide-range perspective does not dispense of making concrete judgements. So both 
collections present ethical discussions about human enhancements—both generally and 
with regard to specific techniques. Although both collections try to provide a variety of 
balanced ethical judgements about human enhancements, there is a strong bias towards a 
positive attitude, embracing the promises of biotechnology to improve the human 
condition. The rather conservative articles constitute a small minority and in the 
introduction of HE, the editors Julian Savulescu and Nick Bostrom even seem to mock the 
article by Michael J. Sandel on ʻʻThe Case Against Perfection: Whatʼs Wrong with Designer 
Children, Bionic Athletes, and Genetic Engineeringʼʼ in their own volume. Of course the 
open- minded attitude towards new developments (widespread among academics) is to be 
preferred to parochial conservativism, but the role of editors of a comprehensive 
introduction consists in including serious critical voices and not only presenting 
stereotypes. In this sense the articles by C.A.J. Coady on ʻʻPlaying Godʼʼ and ʻʻToward a 
More Fruitful Debate About Enhancementʼʼ by Erik Parens (both in HE) are very helpful. 
Both show the ambivalence and ambiguity of any well-considered positions on deeply 
altering human functioning and both urgently call for an integrative discussion on the 
possibility to alter human beings. In this sense, both introductions fall somewhat short of 
the readerʼs justified expectations.
While one would hope for a structured overview and thorough presentation of the field, 
both introductions restrict themselves to some four brief pages of rather general remarks. 
Gordijn/Chadwick point out two charac- teristics of the current debate: Firstly, compared to 
the debate about improving human beings from the 17 and 18th centuries, with its 
profound scientific optimism, the contemporary debate about human enhancement takes 
as a starting point focussing on and questioning medicine as an adequate means of 
improving human lives. Secondly, the new means at hand allow today for interventions that 
formerly belonged to the realm of science fiction. Therefore the current debates tackle 
upcoming problems although they might still seem to be remote. The possibility of 
posthuman beings—understood as technically improved beings, genetically altered beings 
or beings not having a human or living body—belongs to such upcoming problems.
In their introduction to HE, Savulescu/Bostrom also state the obvious practical relevance of 
the biopolitical debate on enhancement and stress the role bioethicists might play in this 
field. Besides, they also note the important theoretical interest of the debate, connected to 
several other philosophical disciplines. Nevertheless, they are sceptical regarding whether 
human enhancements ʻʻconstitute a distinctive cluster of phenomena for which it would be 
appropriate to have a (multidisciplinary) academic subfieldʼʼ (HE, p. 2).
How we can stretch the term ʻʻenhancementʼʼ (as it seems to cover either too large or too 
small a terrain) is the subject of much discussion, but the question what specifi- cally is the 
common core of the multifaceted enhancement debate remains open. One would have 
expected more than these brief remarks from both introductions, particularly as the books 
are meant to serve as comprehensive works of reference for the debate.
A few more—minor—critical remarks: Both books could have provided more information 
about the authors. Applied ethics being an interdisciplinary undertaking, the area of 
specialisation of the author is interesting for the reader. Whereas in HE it was obviously 
left to the authors themselves to indicate or not their affiliation in a footnote, any 
biographical or institutional hints concerning the authors have been thoroughly eliminated 
in MEP. HE has inconsistent referencing and bibliography and could have been proof read 
more carefully in some parts. MEP lacks an index (a service which should be included in 
the price of 159$ per copy).
These minor critiscisms do not affect the fact that both books gather many texts worth 
reading. And in being read together, the two collections provide a thorough and up-to- date 
introduction into the multifaceted debate on biotechnical improvements of human 
functioning. But, is there really something new under the sun? Has any progress taken 
place since the earlier collection ʻʻEnhancing Human Traitsʼʼ, edited in 1998 by Erik 
Parens; or—for lack of new developments—is there a shift of focus in the debate?
Actually, upon a second read, the Parens collection seems to already identify all the crucial 
topics and mentions most arguments found in the new books. There are certainly some 
new techniques that serve as illustrative examples, techniques which were absent some 
ten years ago, but generally speaking, there is no substantial change. This is not meant as 
a reproach against the two new collections—nor is it a special praise for the earlier 
volume, which itself relies on older debates mentioned earlier—, it rather shows that the 
important and far reaching aspects of the debate lie beyond the current hot issues of how 
to stimulate a certain brain region, or which psychopharmaceutic substance brings about a 
specific desired super mental capacity. It is the old philosophical question of what it means 
to be a human being, which is raised emphatically by the possibility to alter our life form.
From this perspective the current excitement about the hot topic of human enhancement in 
applied ethics might appear only to be an academic fashion. Still the topic is important, 
even very important, but less as a field of applied ethics among others, than as the 
challenge to organise the living together of different beings in one world. Considered from 
this point of view, the new collections show—taken as collections rather than through 
single contributions—a hightened awareness of the anthropological dimension of the 
enhancement debate. The focus on posthumans (in MEP), the discussion of the moral 
status of altered beings in relation to ʻʻordinaryʼʼ human beings (Julian Savulescu in HE, 
Dieter Birnbacher in MEP), the quest of identifying posthuman ʻʻgoodsʼʼ (Charles T. Rubin 
in MEP), the playing God argument reconsidered (C.A.J. Coady in HE), and the attempt to 
include non-Western thoughts (Ryuichi Ida in HE, presenting a very traditional 
bioconservative position from an Asian perspective and hence not being the best choice to 
widen the focus); all are asking questions that reach further than how to use a specific 
medical technique in a specific setting.
Ultimately they bring about cosmopolitan questions: How to organise the living together of 
different beings in one world? How to use the (biotechnical and other) means we have at 
hand to improve the individual lives and the living together? What is a good life and which 
possible features of living beings are worth preserving, supporting or bringing about? In 
this view, the enhancement debate is—without exaggeration—the current appearance of 
the philosophical reflection of human self-understanding— with impact on such different 
realms as ethics, politics and philosophical anthropology. Both books provide an excel- 
lent overview over many facets of the debate, but the unifying explanation of the relevance 
of the enhancement debate is still pending.
